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Abstract Criticisms about the safety of biological
control of alien plants has resulted in a risk-averse
approach, where the risks posed by the agent are
paramount and the risks posed by the alien plant are
neglected. We argue that the risk associated with non-
target damage from agents needs to be assessed
relative to that of their target alien plants. A literature
review of the non-target risks associated with biolog-
ical control agents was undertaken in terms of the risk
to native species from agents relative to the risk to
native species from their alien plant targets. We then
developed a framework that compares the conse-
quence with the likelihood of non-target damage for
both agents and their targets to provide an overall risk
rating. Assessments of the risk of damage from both
agents and their target alien plants will enable
researchers, managers and policy makers to better
assess the risks from biological control.
Keywords Non-target effects  Likelihood 
Consequence  Framework  Risk-averse
Introduction
Alien plant species are a significant global problem
(Pimentel 2002). Thus considerable effort has been
directed towards their control and management. One
such control measure, classical weed biological con-
trol (biological control hereafter), uses the alien
plant’s natural enemies as the method of control (van
den Bosch and Messenger 1973). Biological control
has been used for[ 140 years to control alien plants
(McFadyen 1998; Moran and Hoffmann 2015), and
has been shown to be a cost-effective control
technique (Fowler et al. 2000), based on both current
benefit-cost analysis (Page and Lacey 2006) as well as
estimated future benefits (van Wilgen et al. 2004).
Whilst there are significant benefits from the
biological control of alien plants, there have been
some undesirable outcomes, which have resulted in
some major criticisms of the science (e.g. Howarth
1991; Simberloff and Stiling 1996a, b). The basis of
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most criticism is that some agents pose non-target
effects (Simberloff and Stiling 1996a; Fowler et al.
2000; Pemberton 2000; Willis et al. 2003). Some of
the published criticisms about the risks associated with
biological control of alien plants may be misleading in
that they stem from atypical introduction histories (for
example, agents that were not intentionally introduced
into the area where negative impacts have been
recorded, and agents that were released at a time
when the predicted non-target effects were deemed
less important than they are today) (Delfosse 2005;
Fowler et al. 2000; Moran and Hoffmann 2015). The
biological control of alien plants has a significantly
better track record than programs for alien insects and
alien vertebrate pests (Simberloff and Stiling 1996a).
Several iconic ‘failures’ [e.g. cane toads (Bufo mar-
inus) in Australia (Freeland 1986)] and some signif-
icant non-target effects [i.e. to native thistles in the
USA from Rhinocyllus conicus (Delfosse 2005)],
combined with the need to allay public fears of
damage to economically useful plants (Huffaker
1957), has seen the regulators of biological control
of alien plants adopt a risk-averse or precautionary
approach to the release of agents (Moran and
Hoffmann 2015). This risk-averse approach aims to
prevent the risk of non-target effects associated with
the release of agents (i.e. to a native or commercially
valuable species).
The risk-averse position has resulted in the refine-
ment of stringent host-specificity testing (Delfosse
2005), improved test plant selection (Wapshere 1974;
Briese 2003) and host-specificity procedures (Wan
and Harris 1997; Briese 2005), improved pre-release
assessments (Louda et al. 2003), along with stringent
legislation, policy and regulations for releasing bio-
logical control agents (Sheppard et al. 2003; Klein
et al. 2011). Recent assessments of host-specificity
testing results have highlighted how the risk could be
minimised further. For example, Paynter et al. (2015)
found a threshold effect, above which the probability
of host use [non-target effects] rose from virtually zero
to an almost certainty. Developments such as these
have significantly improved the safety record for
biological control agents in recent years (Sheppard
et al. 2003, 2005; Messing and Wright 2006; Suckling
and Sforza 2014).
The adoption of a risk-averse position, however,
could have detrimental outcomes, in that it may limit
the release of effective agents, which pose only minor
risks (Hinz et al. 2014) or no risks at all (Fowler et al.
2012). The impact of this risk-averse approach is not
confined to the direct effect of potentially not
controlling an invasive alien plant, as it has broader
implications for the science and those who work
within it (Moran and Hoffmann 2015).
Ironically despite the risk-averse position adopted,
numerous agents have been released notwithstanding
non-target effects being identified during host-speci-
ficity testing, some of which have subsequently
resulted in minor non-target damage (see Willis
et al. 2003) illustrating significant inconsistencies in
the level of risk which is deemed acceptable and how
risk is applied in the decision and approval making
processes. Such inconsistencies are associated with
the way in which the perceived risk is evaluated
against the perceived benefits of biological control
agents. Typically, the greater the perceived benefits,
the higher the level of acceptable risk that decision
makers are prepared to accept (Delfosse 2005). Thus
decisions to release biological control agents must
encompass both benefits and a range of risks (Shep-
pard et al. 2003; Jetter 2005).
Changes in societal values have also affected how
biological control programs have been perceived as
well as the degree of risk that is deemed accept-
able (Delfosse 2005). For example, native thistles
were considered of little value when the decision to
release R. conicus was made in the late 1960s.
However, changes in societal values have subse-
quently led to increased value being put on native
species, including thistles, during the intervening 40?
years. As predicted by pre-release host specificity
tests, R. conicus went on to attack native thistles
(Zwölfer and Harris 1984). The initial decision to
release R. conicus is now being retrospectively judged
with today’s values, despite the risk being deemed
acceptable at the time of the release (Delfosse 2005;
Suckling and Sforza 2014). Given the impossibility of
predicting future changes in societal values, current
policies and regulations must be underpinned by the
latest scientific knowledge that builds on previous
lessons, combined with robust documentation.
Whilst the introduction of biological control agents
presents a potential risk to non-target species, this is
however not the only associated risk. There are risks
associated with doing nothing, in that alien plants may
continue to threaten native species in the absence of
effective control. Whilst not always explicitly stated,
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the risk of doing nothing is often incorporated as a way
of determining the benefit (McFadyen et al. 2002;
Willis et al. 2003) and by default the target risk. The
use of counterfactuals (i.e. if control had not been
implemented) to determine the benefits of controlling
biological invasions have not, until recently, been used
(see McConnachie et al. 2016), including for biolog-
ical control.
Despite several authors outlining the need to better
document and incorporate the negative effects associ-
ated with the target alien plants in biological programs
(e.g. Moran et al. 2005; Thomas and Reid 2007;
Müller-Schärer and Schaffner 2008), no framework on
how such information could be used in decision
making or risk assessment processes has been pro-
posed, which has led to inconsistencies around the level
of risk deemed to be acceptable. Thus assessments that
combine all the risks relative to the benefits (including
counterfactuals) are needed to determine the net benefit
of introducing a biological control agent.
Here we argue that in many instances the risk
associated with the impacts from the target plant
species on native species is just as important a
consideration as the non-target effect associated with
a biological control agent. The risk associated with the
impact of the target alien invasive plant species should
therefore be considered in the assessment process for
the release of biological control agents.
Definition of risk
A formal definition of risk is adopted here (i.e. Anon
2006), in which risk is assessed through the combi-
nation of the consequences of an event [the risk] and
the likelihood of that event occurring.
How risks have been considered in biological
control
An assessment of the use of the term ‘risk’ in the
literature associated with non-target effects from alien
plant biological control programs showed that the term
has been applied inconsistently. In most instances the
term risk has been used to describe the perceived or
potential risk [i.e. the risk of non-target effects from
agents, or the risk of finding suitable agents (Moran
et al. 2005)], being simply is there a risk or not. The
actual level or degree of risk, however, is rarely
described or quantified, and assessments of risk have
rarely used a formal risk framework, despite the
introduction of risk assessments potentially having
significant benefits (Simberloff and Stiling 1996b;
Shaw et al. 2011).
The current approach to assessing the ‘risks’
associated with the release of a biological control
agent is not in line with other risk assessment systems
used for alien plants, in that a formal risk framework is
not used, despite previous attempts to do so and it
being a requirement in some release procedures (e.g.
Barratt and Moeed 2005; Shaw et al. 2011). Addi-
tionally, Sheppard et al. (2005) outlined how a formal
risk assessment structure could direct biological
control research and thus reduce the risk. Others have
outlined the need for a more formalised risk assess-
ment approach (e.g. Delfosse 2005), whilst Shaw et al.
(2011) used a formal risk assessment framework to
gain approval for the first biological control program
for an alien plant in Europe.
There have been several attempts to assess/deter-
mine the risk associated with the release of biological
control agents for alien plants using approaches that
resemble the formal definition of risk outlined above.
For example, Lonsdale et al. (2001) outlined a risk
framework that comprises an assessment of the
exposure to the risk (i.e. likelihood that the agent
could cause damage) relative to a response associated
with the risk (i.e. level of damage). The framework
however is difficult to apply when the nature of the risk
is multifaceted, or when data is limited (Smith 2006),
both being common problems. Whilst Martin and
Paynter (2010) outlined a process for assessing the
damage from agents in a risk context, which combines
likelihood and consequence, using a series of hypo-
thetical levels of damage to the main plant parts (e.g.
leaves, flowers, stems, etc.).
Wright et al. (2005) proposed the use of precision
trees to assess risk, in which the probability of a
decision is compared with the probability of the
opposition decision (i.e. release or not release) based
on available data. Jetter (2005) outlined the use of an
economic framework in which to evaluate the risks
against the benefits. From this purely economic
perspective, agents should be released where the
benefits outweigh the costs, although it is hard to put
values on costs such as non-target effects or loss of
biodiversity despite some attempts to do so (e.g. van
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Wilgen et al. 2004). Jarvis et al. (2006) demonstrated
the value of evaluating the risk with the benefits, in
that despite potential non-target damage the benefits
outweighed the costs, and the biological control
program was allowed to continue. Moreover, Jetter
(2005) argued that in instances where target alien
plants have high irreversible damage, biological
control is needed sooner. None of the formal risk
assessments have taken an approach in which both the
risk of damage to non-target plants by the biological
control agent and the risk of damage to non-target
plants from the target alien plant are considered.
Agent risk
Despite documented cases of non-target effects, the
incidence of such effects from biological control
agents is small and predictable (Pemberton 2000;
Suckling and Sforza 2014; Moran and Hoffmann
2015). For example, only 3 % of the agents examined
by Funasaki et al. (1988) in Hawaii had non-target
effects, none of which were released post 1967.
Fowler et al. (2000) suggested that as little as two
(0.5 %) of *400 agents released worldwide have
posed significant non-target damage. A recently
published review of non-target impacts of biological
control agents for alien plants found only four of 512
agents (0.8 %) had any adverse effect on non-target
plant populations, all of which were in the same genus
as the target (Suckling and Sforza 2014). Such low
instances, however, are not sufficient evidence alone,
given the limited effort made to monitor and assess
non-target impacts (Simberloff and Stiling 1996a).
The lack of post-release evaluation of non-target
effects associated with the release of biological control
agents has led to criticisms and suggestions that non-
target effects are more common than anticipated (e.g.
Simberloff and Stiling 1996a). However, all assess-
ments of non-target effects made in the last 20 years
show the reverse (i.e. few examples despite large
numbers of agents released) (Fowler et al. 2000;
Suckling and Sforza 2014). Although many authors
have argued that post-release evaluations must be a
priority (e.g. Simberloff and Stiling 1996a, b; Willis
et al. 2003; Paynter et al. 2004; Denslow and
D’Antonio 2005; Hinz et al. 2014), it is still not a
mandatory requirement or routinely undertaken to
examine potential off-target effects.
In a dedicated non-target post-release evaluation of
20 biological control agents across New Zealand,
Paynter et al. (2004) found 16 (80 %) to be host
specific, two (10 %) had veryminor non-target damage
to native plants (sporadic or rare), which was predicted
during host-specificity testing, and two others for
which the non-target damage was not predicted, but
confined to related alien plant taxa. On closer exam-
ination of the host-specificity tests for these agents,
Paynter et al. (2004) concluded that for three of four
agents that posed non-target damage the host-speci-
ficity tests were inadequate and that improved testing
would have predicted the effects prior to release. Host
specificity tests are today more rigorous than those
evaluated by Paynter et al. (2004). The results from
host-specificity tests are typically conservative as the
level of non-target damage observedmay be overstated
by the very nature of no-choice testing (Messing and
Wright 2006) and the broad range of test plants used
(Zwölfer and Harris 1971). Non-target effects can also
be density-dependent in that the local density of the
target alien plant can determine the level of non-target
damage observed to native species (see Rand et al.
2004; Baker and Webber 2008).
Caution should be used when drawing comparisons
between the non-target effects of agents which have
atypical introduction histories with those that have not.
For example, of the ten agents with non-target effects
reviewed by Louda et al. (2003), two have atypical
introductions. The non-target effects attributed to
(i)Cactoblastis cactorum only occurred after it arrived
in Florida, where it was never released as a deliberate
biological control agent and the original releases were
made to control a native plant in the Caribbean
(Pemberton and Liu 2007), and (ii) Larinus carlinae
only occurred when it was deliberately distributed
following its discovery as an incidental introduction in
the USA, its incidental introduction being seen as
beneficial at the time. Whilst these two examples
highlight the dangers and likely outcomes of intro-
ducing new species in an unregulated manner, using
them to illustrate the level of non-target effects
associated with regulated biological control releases
is likely to be misleading given the different intro-
duction processes and level of science, regulation
(legislation and policy) and rigidity of host-specificity
testing prior to regulated releases. Such examples also
contribute to the risk-averse position adopted by
regulators.
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Retrospective assessments of several biological
control agents showed that the current risk-averse
position would have prevented the successful release
of beneficial agents in New Zealand (Fowler et al.
2012) and the USA (Hinz et al. 2014). All five agents
examined by Hinz et al. (2014) would be rejected
under current screening processes. Each of these
agents have significantly contributed to the control of
their respective major invasive alien plant species,
with minimal observed non-target effects. The authors
concluded that assessments based solely on the risks
associated with agents are very likely to lead to missed
opportunities. Both Hinz et al. (2014) and Fowler et al.
(2012) argue that unless improvements are made to
risk assessment processes, potentially successful and
safe agents will be rejected due to an excessively risk-
averse approach. This is not to say that all rejected
agents should be re-evaluated, as some clearly pose a
high level of risk (e.g. Syrett and Harman 1995).
Despite a highly risk-averse approach to the release
of biological control agents, some agents are paradox-
ically released even though host-specificity tests indi-
cate the potential for non-target effects (i.e. a predicted
non-target risk). A number of these agents subse-
quently go on to cause non-target damage (Pemberton
2000; Willis et al. 2003; Delfosse 2005; Taylor et al.
2007). So why are these agents approved for release?
As Willis et al. (2003) found, in every instance the
benefits (i.e. control of the target alien plant) were
deemed to be greater than the perceived risks of
releasing the agent (i.e. damage to non-target species).
Such decisions were not quantified in any standardised
manner despite their obvious importance in the deci-
sion making process to determine the greater of two
potential risks (i.e. from the agent and the target).
Target risk
Despite wide acknowledgement of the threat posed by
alien plants to native species and the role of biological
control in reducing such threats (Loope et al. 2004),
assessments of the potential damage caused by
target alien plants are rarely incorporated into bene-
fit-risk analyses. Information on the native species
threatened by alien plants is also depauperate, despite
wide acknowledgement of the threat posed (e.g. Adair
and Groves 1998; Richardson and van Wilgen 2004;
Downey et al. 2010b). Thus for alien plants like L.
camara that threaten large numbers of native species
(Turner and Downey 2010), the benefits of biological
control are likely to be significantly underestimated.
Some evidence of benefits from biological control
have recently been documented, for example the
recovery of native species five years after the release
of a biological control agent to control Miconia
calvescens in Tahiti (Meyer et al. 2011) and the
successful biological control of Ageratina riparia in
New Zealand which is likely to have saved several
endangered plant species (Barton et al. 2007). The lack
of data on the (i) number of native species that are
threatened by alien invasive plants, and (ii) benefit to
native plants provided by biological control has
contributed to the absence of any kind of formal
evaluation of the ‘target risk’ in biological control
release assessments. As Willis et al. (2003) review
highlighted, incorporation of an unquantified qualita-
tive description of the ‘target risk’ can have important
implications for deciding whether to release an agent
with predicted low levels of non-target damage.
Whilst it is not always possible for biological
control programs to collect data on non-target impacts
from specific target alien plant species, the discipline,
decision and policy makers, as well as regulatory
authorities should continue to work with other disci-
plines to ensure that such data is collected and made
available. For example, Coutts-Smith and Downey
(2006) outlined how decisions about managing the
threat from alien plants could substantially be
improved (i.e. for almost half of the 419 threatened
species examined) if researchers working on threat-
ened species had documented the actual alien plant
threat rather than describing threat generically as
being caused by weeds. It is however possible for
biological control researchers to collate available
information on species threatened by target alien
plants from the literature and databases like those
complied by Coutts-Smith and Downey (2006) in
Australia, Wilcove et al. (1998) in the US and the
IUCN Red list (IUCN 2015) globally.
Considering multiple risks: the value of like-for-
like risks
Multi-criteria analysis approaches are increasingly
being used to assist decisions between alternatives in
environmental management (see Mendoza and
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Martins 2006; Linkov et al. 2006), although their
application to alien plant management is rare (Cook
and Proctor 2007; Benke et al. 2011; Sinden et al.
2013). Such multi-criteria analysis methods incorpo-
rate criteria on a range of environmental, economic,
social, and organisational performance, thereby assist-
ing choices with multiple objectives and alternatives.
Despite this approach having merit for assessing and
managing the complete risk of releasing a biological
control agent, no such assessment has been done.
Consideration of the relative risk of non-target
damage to native species from the combination of an
agent and its target alien plant into the assessment
process of releasing agents does not involve assessing
alternative choices, but rather the inclusion of a like-
for-like comparison. We are therefore advocating for
the inclusion of both risks (i.e. agent and target risk as
a collective) in the decision making process, not a
choice of two alternative risks.
A proposed framework for considering like-for-
like risks
Here we outline an assessment framework that can be
used to evaluate the non-target agent risk against that
of the target (i.e. to native species). The proposed
framework uses matrices to assess the same (or like-
for-like) risk, being non-target damage, from two
perspectives (agent and target) (Tables 1, 2). Incor-
poration of other risks would require a multi-criteria
comparative risk approach (e.g. Benke et al. 2011) and
decisions about alternatives (see above). These risk
matrices encompass an assessment of the consequence
of the non-target damage from an agent (Table 1) and
the target (Table 2), being benign through to catas-
trophic, and the likelihood of non-target damage,
being very unlikely through to very likely, along with
an indicative description of what each category
encompasses and the criteria for selecting each
(Supplementary tables S1 and S2). Each of the 16
cells in the risk matrices is given a risk rating (high,
medium, low or minuscule) and a description of an
indicative outcome.
When determining the criteria for assessing the
likelihood and consequence for the agent risk, we used
the ‘worst’ case example of non-target damage from
the literature of a deliberate introduction of a biocon-
trol agent being R. conicus to establish the very likely
and catastrophic criteria (Supplementary table S1).
Whilst C. cactorum in the USA provides another
‘worst’ case example, it was not used due to its
atypical introduction history (see discussion above)
and because the proposed framework is designed for
regulated releases. Also we could not use C. cactorum
in the framework as there is no target in the USA and
to evaluate the risk, an assessment of the potential for
the agent to disperse from the Caribbean to the USA
would also be needed. These worst case criteria were
then used as a benchmark when establishing the
remaining criteria. A similar process was used for
determining the likelihood and consequence criteria
for targets, in which the ‘worst’ case example from the
literature was Lantana camara (Supplementary
table S2).
In the third step of the framework, a matrix was
used to assess the combination of the agent and target
risk (Table 3). The combination of risk ratings from
each assessment provides an overall risk rating for the
non-target damage (Table 3). In addition, we provide
a description of the nature of the risk with respect to
making decisions around the level of risk which might
be deemed acceptable. Our rating B ‘‘further testing is
required’’ is not designed to pick up problems with
host-specificity test lists (as is the case with Acono-
phora compressa) as there is already a process for this
available (see Wapshere 1974; Briese 2003). Instead
our rating B is designed to ensure that decision makers
have sufficient information in order to accept or reject
an agent based on the level of risk predicted. The
outcome of rating B is that in order to make such a
decision more information is needed. Similar
approaches have been proposed in the context of
biological invasions (e.g. Simberloff and Alexander
1998) but not in the context of biological control to the
best of our knowledge.
Account for uncertainty
The use of host-specificity testing of biological control
agents prior to release significantly reduces the level of
uncertainty associated with the decision supported by
reviews of non-target damage from released agents
which shows the level of unpredicted non-target
damage to be extremely low, especially since the
adoption of stringent host-specificity testing (Fowler
et al. 2000; Suckling and Sforza 2014). Additionally,
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we used the terms threat and impact (as defined by
Downey et al. 2010b) to account for some of the
uncertainty associated with the non-target damage
from target alien plants in the assessment criteria, in
that impacts are measurable/quantifiable, and threats
are assumed but uncertain (see Supplementary
table S2).
Using the framework
We identified six examples from the literature for
which there was sufficient information on the non-
target effects from both agents and their target alien
plants (i.e. a like-for-like assessment) to populate the
matrices (Tables 4, 5). We included three examples
from the USA, two from Australia and one from New
Zealand, which span a range of agents and targets
(including life forms). For many of the agents with
non-target damage to native species, information on
the non-target damage from their target alien plants to
native species was lacking or not quantified in a way
that could be used here, despite extensive searches of
the literature. For example, the collective risk from the
combination of Carduus nutans and R. conicus could
not be assessed, because despite sufficient information
on the agent, very little information on the impact of
the target alien plant to native species could be found.
Table 1 Agent risk matrix—the risk event is non-target damage following the release of a biological control agent, which is a
combination of the consequence and likelihood of the risk occurring
 Consequence 
(of non-target damage from the agent) 




























non-target effects are 
certain and will be 
very destructive 
Medium 
non-target effects are 
certain and will be 
damaging 
Medium 
non-target effects are 
certain and will result 
in minor, or sporadic 
damage 
Low 
non-target effects are 
certain, however such 
effects will not result in 
measurable damage 
    
Likely  
High 
non-target effects are 
likely and will be 
very destructive 
Medium 
non-target effects are 
likely and will be 
damaging 
Low 
non-target effects are 
likely and will result 
in minor damage 
Minuscule 
non-target effects are 
likely, however such 
effects will not result in 
measurable damage 
 A. nigriscutis N. gunniella  
Unlikely 
Medium 










non-target effects are 
unlikely and any 
damage will be minor 
Minuscule 
non-target effects are 





 D. elongata 
















non-target effects are 
extremely unlikely 
and any damage will 
be minor 
Minuscule 
non-target effects are 
extremely unlikely with 
no measurable damage 
    
A risk rating and a description of the likely outcome of the assessment is presented for each of the 16 cells of the matrix. The six
examples of agents posing non-target damage outlined in Table 4 have been assessed using the criteria in Supplementary table S1 to
determine their risk rating for consequence and likelihood. Shading in the cells represent the level of agent risk with white being high,
pale-grey being medium, intermediate-grey being low, and dark-grey being minuscule
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In each of these six examples, the non-target
damage [consequence] from the alien plant was either
catastrophic or pervasive, which is partly an artefact,
in that most biological control is focused on control-
ling the ‘worst’ alien plant species. The target risk to
non-target species, in all six examples, is higher than
the agent risk, despite the criteria for agents being
lower in terms of the number of species affected
(Supplementary tables S1 and S2). Agents that have a
high non-target risk for which their target alien plant
poses a low impact should be avoided, whilst agents
that pose a low or minuscule non-target risk for which
their targets pose a very high impact should be sought.
Whilst these examples reflect actual releases, the
proposed framework is designed to assess new agents
for release, or alternatively to make decisions about
starting a new program. In such instances the proposed
tool may help decision makers to decide if focusing on
a target with low impacts is warranted or not.
Our assessment shows that for four of the examples
the risk could be deemed to be low given the low level
of non-target damage observed by the agent and the
high level of non-target damage posed by the
target alien plant. Two of the examples illustrate that,
despite high level of non-target damage from the
target alien plant, the level of non-target damage from
the agent is such that the overall level of risk could be
deemed unacceptable. For the first example, despite
the non-target damage from Aphthona nigriscutis
being density-dependent (Baker andWebber 2008), its
Table 2 Target risk matrix—the risk event is impacts to native species from alien plant biological control targets, which is a
combination of the consequence and likelihood of the risk occurring
 Consequence 
(of impact to native species from the target alien plant) 
 





































impacts to native 
species are certain 
and will be very 
destructive 
Medium 
impacts to native 
species are certain 
and will be damaging 
Medium 
impacts to native 
species are certain 
and will result in 
minor damage 
Low 
impacts to native 
species are certain but 








impacts to native 
species are likely and 
will be very 
destructive 
Medium 
impacts to native 
species are likely and 
will be damaging 
Low 
impacts to native 
species are likely and 
will result in minor 
damage 
Minuscule 
impacts to native 
species are likely but 
will not result in 
measurable damage 
C. vitalba 




impacts to native 
species are unlikely 
despite being very 
destructive 
Medium 
impacts to native 




impacts to native 
species are unlikely 
and any damage will 
be minor 
Minuscule 
impacts to native 
species are unlikely 
with no measurable 
damage 




impacts to native 
species are extremely 
unlikely despite 
being potentially very 
destructive 
Low 
impacts to native 
species are extremely 
unlikely despite being 
potentially damaging 
Minuscule 
impacts to native 
species are extremely 
unlikely and any 
damage will be minor 
Minuscule 
impacts to native 
species are extremely 
unlikely with no 
measurable damage 
    
A risk rating and a description of the likely outcome of the assessment is presented for each of the 16 cells of the matrix. The six
examples of target alien plants posing non-target damage outlined in Table 5 have been assessed using the criteria in Supplementary
table S2 to determine their risk rating for consequence and likelihood. Shading in the cells represent the level of target risk with white
being high, pale-grey being medium, intermediate-grey being low, and dark-grey being minuscule
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release on Euphorbia esula should have warranted
more stringent assessments (as opposed to reject)
based on our framework. For the second example, the
potential of Galerucella calmaiensis and G. pusilla to
feed on non-target native plants also may have
warranted further assessment. In this case, the damage
to native plants from the agent has no lasting negative
consequences as predicted from host specificity testing
(Blossey et al. 2001a, b).
Despite not having data on the non-target effects to
native species for many of the target alien plants,
inferences or assumptions could be made as to the
likely risk level (i.e. in Table 2). For example, if we
assumed that many of the native thistles threatened by
R. conicus were also likely to be threatened by C.
nutans in the USA (i.e. through competition), we
might assign C. nutans [target] a likely and catas-
trophic non-target impact to native species (see
Supplementary table S2). Rhinocyllus conicus [agent]
in this case would be assigned very likely and
catastrophic (see Supplementary table S1), which
collectively would result in an unacceptable level of
risk (i.e. from the combined agent-target matrix
(Table 5)). Even if there was a major positive net
benefit from the introduction of R. conicus, due to very
high negative impacts of C. nutans to native species
before control, our framework would not support its
release, in line with other conclusions that R. conicus
would not be released today (Delfosse 2005; Suckling
and Sforza 2014). We have reduced subjectivity by
outlining a range of criteria for each risk category for
both the agent and target, based on information in the
literature and the use of ‘worst case’ examples as
benchmarks (see Supplementary tables S1 and S2). As
new information becomes available the criteria in
Supplementary tables S1 and S2 can be refined.
It is important to note that the outcome of the
framework is not a reflection of the degree to which an
agent should be released. We have just discussed this
here in the context of actual examples. Instead our
Table 3 Combined matrix of the agent and their respective target risks, from Tables 1 and 2 respectively
Agent risk assessment outcome  
(from Table 1) 
 


























C B A A 
 
A. nigriscutis on 
E. esula 
 
A. compressa on L. camara 
 
P. vitalbae on C. vitalba 
Medium 
C B A A 
 
G. calmariensis & 
G. pusilla on 
L. salicaria 
D. elongata on Tamarix spp. 
 
N. gunniella on M. pigra 
Low C C B A 
    
Minuscule C C B A 




A The level of non-target damage is considered to be low and an appropriate level of risk has been demonstrated 
 for a release. 
B The level of non-target damage is such that further testing is required to ensure that an appropriate level of risk 
 is achieved before a release is made. 
C The level of non-target damage is deemed unacceptable and thus agents with this rating should not be released. 
A description of the combined risk rating (A, B or C) is presented in the table below. The six examples are presented along with their
respective combined risk rating. Shading in the cells represents the three different combined risk ratings A, B and C
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framework provides a way of holistically balancing
risks to help managers, decision makers and regulatory
authorities responsible for granting permission to
release agents an extra tool to determine the level of
risk they are prepared to accept when assessing agents
for release or targets to work on.
Discussion
To improve biological control outcomes, processes are
needed to better understand the impacts of both the
agent and target alien plant (Thomas and Reid 2007).
In one such attempt, Moran and Zimmermann (1984)
used a matrix-based approach to evaluate the success
of individual biological control agents. Whilst this
approach provided a framework to consider both the
target and agent, it was not adopted or used for
assessing the risks or non-target impacts. Additionally,
whilst Hirose (1999) proposed the concept of cate-
gorising non-target effects/impacts, this approach
does not seem to have been adopted, for either the
agent or the target.
The lack of a framework or process that accounts
for the effects of the target alien plant as well as the
agent has led to many inconsistencies in the level of
risk that is deemed to be acceptable and approval of
agents. For example, agents are released despite
predictions of non-target damage to native species
(e.g. Paynter et al. 2004).
Whilst consideration of the target risk has been
made when releasing some agents, there is no
standardised framework for comparing such risks. In
virtually all instances the justification provided for the
target risk is qualitative, with no guidance provided on
how such assessments were undertaken. Thus the
target risk is not given the same level of precision or
assessment as that given to assessing the risk from the
agent. Given that the regulatory authorities responsi-
ble for granting permission to release biological
control agents in some countries have adopted a risk-
averse position by focusing on only a subset of the
risks, it is imperative that a more robust process is
adopted which accounts for the target risks. When
such assessments have been given a more equal
emphasis the focus of the risk changes. For example,
whilst Pearson and Callaway (2008) outlined major
indirect non-target effects associated with the release
of a biological control agent to control spotted
knapweed (Centaurea stoebe), the authors also
Table 5 Examples of non-target damage from target alien plant species




USA 32 common native plant species
More than two species of native herbivores
Two native bird species
Belcher and Wilson (1989); Butler and
Cogon (2004); Trammell and Butler





USA Reduction in native plant species (at least two
species)
Six bird species
Blossey et al. (2001a)
3 Tamarix spp.
(salt cedar)
USA 12 native bird species
Arthropods and insect pollinators
One native fish
Brand et al. (2010); Pendleton et al.




Australia 1,321 native plant and 158 native animal species (275
native plant and 24 native animal species require
immediate protection)





Australia Decrease in native species (flora e.g. more than 5 tree
species ? others, and fauna two birds and two
reptiles)






35 native plant species Ogle et al. (2000)
The targets are the same as those in Table 1 with the same number
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acknowledged that these effects dwarfed the direct
negative effect of controlling spotted knapweed with
herbicides. Also Blossey et al. (2001a) concluded that
the negative impacts justified the need for biological
control of purple loosestrife (Lythrum salicaria), as
the potential benefits outweighed any potential risks.
Because there is no standardised approach or
mechanism for inclusion of the target risk in the
assessment system for biological control releases,
decisions can become constrained due to misplaced
emphasis on the potentially lesser of the two risks. For
example, Dudley and Deloach (2004) highlighted how
non-target effects on a single native species from a
biological control program managed to override
evidence of the multiple native species affected by
the alien target. This situation would have been
prevented if a system that compares the relative risks
was available.
Risk-averse or risky?
The major drawback of adopting a risk-averse position
is that decisions tend to be made based around
outcomes with a higher chance of success, even if
the potential benefits are lower. As illustrated by Hinz
et al. (2014), the current risk-averse position is not
necessarily resulting in optimal outcomes. Not releas-
ing some agents that attack native plants may endanger
other native species through the effects of the
target alien plant (Harris 1988). Moreover, excessive
caution associated with a risk-averse position can be
counter-productive (and costly) when it inhibits ben-
eficial biological control programs (Dudley and
Kazmer 2005).
Despite the regulatory authorities adopting a risk-
averse position, numerous agents have been released
for which adverse risks were known through host-
specificity testing. In addition, the level of risk deemed
acceptable in these instances varies considerably,
often being offset by the perceived benefit, which is
not always assessed adequately. Moreover, such
decisions are not made using a consistent framework
and levels of risk that are deemed acceptable differ
between countries (see Hinz et al. 2014). Thus a
framework is needed to ensure that such decisions and
the level of risk deemed acceptable is comparable
across releases. Whilst the inclusion of increased risk
assessment procedures has resulted in increased costs
of biological control (Fowler et al. 2010), the resultant
increase in transparency and lack of overt political
involvement has significant benefits (Barratt and
Moeed 2005; Shaw et al. 2011).
Determining the value of including the target risk
Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) outline the importance
of including an evaluation framework in conservation
practices, not just in terms of determining the outcome
of management, but also in terms of evaluating and
improving decision making processes and frameworks
[adaptive management], and Bull et al. (2014) high-
light the importance of having baseline data for
making and evaluating conservation decisions. Whilst
host-specificity tests can be used to evaluate the agent
risk and post-release evaluations of non-target effects
can be used to assess the effectiveness of such tests, no
such system exists for the target risk. A similar
situation exists with respect to baseline data on
establishing non-target damage.
Given the low level of post-release evaluations of
non-target effects undertaken (see Paynter et al. 2004)
and the paucity of data on the actual impacts from
alien plants on specific native species (see Blossey
1999), it is critical that appropriate data be collected to
adequately evaluate the target and agent risks in the
future, which can also be used to assess the framework
proposed. We provided specific criteria for determin-
ing the level of non-target damage (both likelihood
and consequence) for both agents and targets (Sup-
plementary tables S1 and S2), for which evaluations of
the proposed framework can be undertaken in the
future. Approaches to collect such data currently exist
(e.g. Paynter et al. 2004; Turner and Downey 2010).
Other risks
The framework presented here enables the comparison
of like-for-like risks associated with non-target dam-
age to native species from both the agent and its
target alien plant to be incorporated into a decision
making process. Accounting for the full gamut of
risks, however, would require a multi-criteria analysis
(e.g. Mendoza and Martins 2006) and a thorough
examination of all the possible risks, alternatives and
benefits. Examples of other risks include the risk of
agents failing to establish or impact upon the target
plant (McClay and Balciunas 2005) or the risk of
broader non-target effects [i.e. multi-trophic effects
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(Carvalheiro et al. 2008)]. Our ability to evaluate such
risks can be problematic, for example, the risk of an
agent failing to establish in the field or impact upon the
target species. The desired management outcome will
determine the type of risk that should be included as
well as the specific criteria needed to evaluate such
risks (Downey et al. 2010a). Here we focused on the
non-target effects to native species.
In conclusion, whilst we have outlined how the
inclusion of assessments of both the agent and target
risks can result in a more holistic understanding of the
risk of releasing a biological control agent, thiswork has
illustrated that the science of biological control needs to
determine the level of risk that is deemed acceptable,
once the target risk is incorporated. We argue that a
slightly less risk-averse position could be adopted if a
framework for making decisions was available, because
without a framework, risky decisions could be made
despite the risk-averse position adopted by the author-
ities responsible for decisions on releases.
We have highlighted here how already existing risk
assessment approaches can be used in biological
control assessments without major modification, and
that these approaches are grounded in legislation and
polices globally and thus increasing the likelihood of
their adoption for biological control more broadly. We
have used the literature and actual examples to
construct our framework, which should also help with
its adoption. Moreover, there is a need to include the
target risk into the decision making processes for
releasing biological control agents, in a formalised
manner. Whilst we have proposed a framework, post-
release monitoring and evaluation of both the agent
and target, including non-target effects, must underpin
and be formally incorporated into any risk assessment
approach that is developed and should also be used to
assess its effectiveness.
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Müller-Schärer H, Schaffner U (2008) Classical biological
control: exploiting enemy escape to manage plant inva-
sions. Biol Invasions 10:859–874
Ogle CC, La Cock GD, Arnold G,Mickleson N (2000) Impact of
an exotic vine Clematis vitalba (F. Ranunculaceae) and
control measures on plant biodiversity in indigenous forest,
Taihape, New Zealand. Aust Ecol 25:539–551
Page AR, Lacey KL (2006) Economic impact assessment of
Australian weed biological control. Technical Series No.
10, CRC for Australian Weed Management, Adelaide
Palmer WA, Heard TA, Sheppard AW (2010) A review of
Australian classical biological control of weeds programs
and research activities over the past 12 years. Biol Control
52:271–287
Paynter QE, Fowler SV, Gourlay AH, Haines ML, Harman HM,
Hona SR, Peterson PG, Smith LA, Wilson-Davey JRA,
Winks CJ, Withers TM (2004) Safety in New Zealand
weed biocontrol: a nationwide survey for impacts on non-
target plants. N Z Plant Prot 57:102–107
Paynter Q, Waipara N, Peterson P, Hona S, Fowler S, Gianotti
A, Wilkie P (2006) The impact of two introduced bio-
control agents, Phytomyza vitalbae and Phoma clematid-
ina, on Clematis vitalba in New Zealand. Biol Control
36:350–357
Paynter Q, Martin N, Berry J, Hona S, Peterson P, Gourlay AH,
Wilson-Davey J, Smith L, Winks C, Fowler SV (2008)
Non-target impacts of Phytomyza vitalbae a biological
control agent of the European weed Clematis vitalba in
New Zealand. Biol Control 44:248–258
Paynter Q, Fowler SV, Gourlay AH, Peterson PG, Smith LA,
Winks CJ (2015) Relative performance on test and target
plants in laboratory tests predicts the risk of non-target
attack in the field for arthropod weed biocontrol agents.
Biol Control 80:133–142
Pearson DE, Callaway RM (2008) Weed biocontrol insects
reduce native-plant recruitment through second-order
apparent competition. Ecol Appl 18:1489–1500
Pemberton RW (1985) Native plant considerations in biological
control of leafy spurge. In: Delfosse ES (ed) Proceedings of
the VI international symposium on biological control of
weeds. Agriculture Canada, Ottawa, pp 57–71
Pemberton RW (2000) Predictable risk to native plants in weed
biological control. Oecologia 125:489–494
Pemberton RW, Liu H (2007) Control and persistence of native
Opuntia on Nevis and St. Kitts 50 years after the intro-
duction of Cactoblastis cactorum. Biol Control
41:272–282
Pendleton RL, Pendleton BK, Finch D (2011) Displacement of
native riparian shrubs by woody exotics: effects on
arthropod and pollinator community composition. Nat
Resour Env Iss 16:185–195
Pimentel D (2002) Biological invasions: economic and envi-
ronmental costs of alien plant, animal and microbe species.
CRC Press, London
Rand TA, Russell FL, Louda SM (2004) Local- vs. landscape-
scale indirect effects of an invasive weed on native plants.
Weed Technol 18:1250–1254
Richardson DM, vanWilgen BW (2004) Invasive alien plants in
South Africa: how well do we understand the ecological
impacts? S Afr J Sci 100:45–52
Scheiman DM, Bollinger EK, Johnson DH (2003) Effects of
leafy spurge infestation on grassland birds. J Wildl Manag
67:115–121
Shaw RH, Tanner R, Djeddour D, Cortat G (2011) Classical
biological control of Fallopia japonica in the United
Kingdom—lessons for Europe. Weed Res 51:552–558
Sheppard AW, Hill R, DeClerck-Floate RA, McClay A, Olckers
T, Quimby PC Jr, Zimmermann HG (2003) A global
review of risk-benefit–cost analysis for the introduction of
classical biological control agents against weeds: a crisis in
the making? Biocontrol News Inf 24:91N–108N
Sheppard AW, van Klinken RD, Heard TA (2005) Scientific
advances in the analysis of direct risks of weed biological
control agents to nontarget plants. Biol Control
35:215–226
Simberloff D, Alexander M (1998) Assessing risks to ecological
systems from biological introductions. In: Calow P (ed)
Encompassing agent and target risks in biocontrol 629
123
Handbook of environmental risk assessment and manage-
ment. Blackwell Science, London, pp 147–176
Simberloff D, Stiling P (1996a) How risky is biocontrol? Ecol
77:1965–1974
Simberloff D, Stiling P (1996b) Risks of species introduced for
biological control. Biol Conserv 78:185–192
Sinden J, Downey PO, Cacho O, Hester SM (2013) Cost
effectiveness in site selection to protect native plant com-
munities from the weed, bitou bush, in New South Wales,
Australia. J Environ Manag 128:1071–1080
Smith L (2006) Risk assessment of Ceratapion basicorne, a
rosette weevil of yellow starthistle. In: Hoddle MS, John-
son MW (eds) Proceedings of the California conference on
biological control V. Riverside, California, pp 47–54
Suckling DM, Sforza RFH (2014)What magnitude are observed
non-target impacts from weed biocontrol. PLoS ONE
9(1):e84847
Syrett P, Harman HM (1995) Identification of risk to kowhai, a
New Zealand native plant Sophora microphylla Ait., from
a potential biological control agent for broom, Cytisus
scoparius (L.) Link. N Z J Zool 22:305–309
Taylor DBJ, Heard TA, Paynter Q, Spafford H (2007) Nontarget
effects of a weed biological control agent on a native plant
in Northern Australia. Biol Control 42:25–33
Thomas MB, Reid AM (2007) Are exotic natural enemies an
effective way of controlling invasive plants? Trends Ecol
Evol 22:447–453
Trammell MA, Butler JL (1995) Effects of exotic plants on
native ungulate use of habitat. J Wildl Manag 59:808–816
Turner PJ, Downey PO (2010) Ensuring invasive alien plant
management delivers biodiversity conservation: insights
from a new approach using Lantana camara. Plant Prot Q
25:102–110
van den Bosch R, Messenger PS (1973) The Biological Control.
Intext Press Inc., New York
vanWilgen BW, deWitMP, Anderson HJ, LeMaitre DC, Kotze
IM, Ndala S, Brown B, Rapholo MB (2004) Costs and
benefits of biological control of invasive alien plants: case
studies from South Africa. S Afr J Sci 100:113–122
Wan FH, Harris P (1997) Use of risk analysis for screening weed
biocontrol agents: Altica carduorum Guer. (Coleoptera:
Chrysomelidae) from China as a biocontrol agent of
Cirsium arvense (L.) Scop. in North America. Biocontrol
Sci Technol 7:299–308
Wapshere AJ (1974) A strategy for evaluating the safety of
organisms for biological weed control. Ann Appl Biol
77:201–211
Wilcove DS, Rothstein D, Dubow J, Phillips A, Losos E (1998)
Quantifying threats to imperilled species in the United
States. BioScience 48:607–615
Willis AJ, Kilby MJ, McMaster K, Cullen JM, Groves RH
(2003) Predictability and acceptability: potential for dam-
age to nontarget native plant species by biological control
agents for weeds. In: Spafford-Jacob H, Briese DT (eds)
Improving the selection, testing and evaluation of weed
biological control agents, Technical Series 7. CRC for
Australian Weed Management, Adelaide, pp 35–49
Wright MG, Hoffmann MP, Kuhar TP, Gardner J, Pitcher SA
(2005) Evaluating risks of biological control introductions:
a probabilistic risk-assessment approach. Biol Control
35:338–347
Zwölfer H, Harris P (1971) Host specificity determination of
insects for biological control of weeds. Ann Rev Entomol
16:159–178
Zwölfer H, Harris P (1984) Biology and host specificity of
Rhynocyllus conicus (Froel.) (Coleoptera, Curculionidae),
a successful agent for biocontrol of the thistle, Cardus
nutans L. Zeitschrift für Angewandte Entomologie
97:36–62
Paul O. Downey is an associate professor at the Institute for
Applied Ecology, University of Canberra, Australia. His
research areas include alien species management, risk assess-
ment and prioritisation. He has worked on alien species for
almost 20 years across a wide range of areas.
Iain D. Paterson is a research entomologist in the Biological
Control Research Group at Rhodes University, South Africa.
His research interests include measuring the impact of invasive
alien plants, quantifying the impact of biological control agents
and developing new biological control agents for the control of
problematic weeds.
630 P. O. Downey, I. D. Paterson
123
